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Abstract
Computationally efficient matrix multiplication is a fundamental requirement in various fields,
including and particularly in data analytics. To do so, the computation task of a large-scale
matrix multiplication is typically outsourced to multiple servers. However, due to data misusage
at the servers, security is typically of concern. In this paper, we study the two-sided secure
matrix multiplication problem, where a user is interested in the matrix product AB of two
finite field private matrices A and B from an information-theoretic perspective. In this problem,
the user exploits the computational resources of N servers to compute the matrix product,
but simultaneously tries to conceal the private matrices from the servers. Our goal is twofold:
(i) to maximize the communication rate, and, (ii) to minimize the effective number of server
observations needed to determine AB, while preserving security, where we allow for up to ℓ ≤ N
servers to collude. To this end, we propose a general aligned secret sharing scheme for which
we optimize the matrix partition of matrices A and B in order to either optimize objective (i)
or (ii) as a function of the system parameters (e.g., N and ℓ). A proposed inductive approach
gives us analytical, close-to-optimal solutions for both (i) and (ii). With respect to (i), our scheme
significantly outperforms the existing scheme of Chang and Tandon in terms of (a) communication
rate, (b) maximum tolerable number of colluding servers and (c) computational complexity.
Index Terms
Matrix Multiplication, Security, Interference Alignment, Secret Sharing, Straggler Mitigation.
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I. Introduction
In machine learning and scientific computation, matrix multiplication plays an important
role. However, in many cases high memory requirements and computational effort is required.
Distributed approaches have been used to circumvent computational and memory related
barriers of matrix multiplication [1]–[4]. Although distributed matrix multiplication can
resolve computational and memory related difficulties, it causes new security problems. In
the cryptography literature, different schemes have been proposed that balance security and
efficiency of distributed matrix multiplication. Bultel et al. [5] suggest partially homomorphic
encryption approaches in the framework of MapReduce matrix multiplication. In other
related works, cryptographic techniques are applied to the problem of distributed matrix
multiplication in cloud computing [6], [7].
As opposed to cryptographic techniques, information-theoretic techniques have been hardly
applied to the problem of secure matrix multiplication. In [8], Nodehi and Maddah-Ali
apply information theory to the framework of limited-sharing multi-party computation. In
limited-sharing multi-party computation, a set of sources offload the computation task, i.e.,
computing a polynomial function of input matrices available at the sources, to a set of
servers. The result of the computation has to be delivered to a master node. The authors
propose an efficient polynomial sharing scheme that minimizes the number of required servers
(which is known as recovery threshold) while preserving the privacy of colluding servers and
the master. Similar schemes have been applied to the context of non-uniform computation
delays at the servers [9].
In [10], Chang and Tandon study the communication rate of a secure matrix multiplication
problem consisting of a single user and N curious servers which are responsible for the
computation of two matrices available at the user. The communication rate is seeked to be
maximized when ℓ servers collude. The authors divide the security problem in two models.
(i) One-sided: Only one of the two matrices is private. The other matrix is publicly
available at all servers.
(ii) Two-sided: Both matrices stored at the user are private and not available at the
servers.
While for the one-sided model, they characterize the capacity with respect to the commu-
nication rate, the capacity for the two-sided model remains unknown. By comparing with
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Fig. 1: System model of the two-sided distributed matrix multiplication problem.
the converse, their proposed scheme for the second model seems to be loose in terms of
communication rate and the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers supporting a
non-zero rate.
In this paper, we propose a novel aligned secret sharing scheme under arbitrary matrix
partition for the two-sided model to optimize the two conflicting metrics – (i) rate and (ii)
recovery threshold. To this end, we formulate two optimization problems, (i) one which maxi-
mizes the rate and (ii) the other which minimizes the number of effective server needed when
computing AB subject to a minimum rate constraint. Both optimization problems find the
optimal matrix partition of the matrices A and B. Through an inductive approach, we find
analytical, close-to-optimal solutions of the optimization problems. These solutions identify
the optimal matrix partition as a function of N and ℓ and a minimum rate requirement Rth.
With respect to objective (i), our scheme significantly improves upon the scheme of Chang
and Tandon in terms of rate, computational complexity on the servers and the maximum
number of tolerable colluding servers. While the maximum number of tolerable colluding
servers of the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon is equal to ⌊√N−1⌋, our scheme attains
a non-zero rate for up to ⌊(N−1)/2⌋ colluding servers. Despite of the higher communication
rate in comparison to [10], our scheme attains a lower computational complexity at the
servers.
Notations: Throughout this paper, boldface lower-case and capital letters represent
vectors and matrices, respectively. Further, for any two integers a, b with a ≤ b, we define
[a : b] , {a, a+1, . . . , b} and we denote [1 : b] simply as [b]. Z refers to the set of all integers,
while Z+ to the subset of positive integers.
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II. System Model
In a fully, or two-sided, secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in
computing the matrix product AB of two private matrices A ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×p1 securely
(see Fig. 1). Hereby, the user has access to a distributed computation system consisting of
N honest, but curious computation servers connected to the user by private, error-free links.
The user seeks the support of these servers but aims at concealing A and B from the servers.
To this end, the user deploys encoding functions fi and gi to generate securely encoded
matrices A˜i = fi(A) and B˜i = gi(B) which are sent to the i-th server. The set of all N
encoding functions with respect to matrices A and B are denoted by f = ( f1, . . . , fN ) and
g = (g1, . . . , gN), respectively.
Since every server i is by assumption honest, the answer of the i-th server denoted by Zi
is a deterministic function2 of A˜i and B˜i, i.e.,
H(Zi |A˜i, B˜i) = 0.
The user has to be able to determine AB after applying the decoding function d(·) on the
collection of all N answers Z1, . . . ,ZN . i.e., AB = d(Z1, . . . ,ZN), or information-theoretically
satisfy the decodability constraint
H(AB |Z1, . . . ,ZN) = 0. (1)
In this paper, we study the (N, ℓ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem. In this
setting, security has to be preserved when ℓ ≤ N servers may collude. In other words,
despite having access to the collection of encoded matrices A˜L and B˜L , L ⊆ [N], |L| = ℓ,
secrecy has to be maintained. Thus, A˜L and B˜L do not reveal any information on the private
matrices A and B. This is expressed information-theoretically by the security constraint
I(A˜L, B˜L ;A,B) = 0, ∀L ⊆ [N], |L| = ℓ. (2)
Next, we define two conflicting metrics – (i) rate and (ii) recovery threshold – which we seek
to optimize in subsequent sections.
1Each element is from a sufficiently large field F.
2This function is known by the user.
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First, we say the rate RN,ℓ is achievable if there exists f, g and d(·) satisfying the decod-
ability and security constraints. The rate RN,ℓ is the ratio between the number of desired
bits vs. the number of downloaded bits and is thus given by
RN,ℓ =
H(AB)∑N
i=1 H(Zi)
. (3)
The capacity C is the supremum of RN,ℓ over all achievable schemes.
Second, we call a secure matrix multiplication strategy to be ωN,ℓ-securely recoverable if
the user can recover the matrix product AB from results of Ω ⊆ [N], |Ω| = ωN,ℓ servers while
complying with the security constraint when any combination of ℓ ≤ N servers collude. The
recovery threshold is theminimum integer ωN,ℓ such that the multiplication scheme composed
of encoders f, g and decoder d(·) is ωN,ℓ-securely recoverable.
III. Aligned secret sharing scheme with Matrix Partition
In an (N, ℓ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in computing
AB using N servers without revealing ℓ colluding servers information about A and B.
To this end, the user breaks A vertically into rA sub-matrices and B horizontally into rB
sub-matrices, i.e.,
A =

A1
A2
...
ArA

and B =
[
B1 B2 . . . BrB
]
.
Thus, we get A and B by concatenating the sub-matrices Ai ∈ F(m/rA)×n, i ∈ [rA] and
B j ∈ Fn×(p/rB), j ∈ [rB]. The number of rows m and n are multiple of rA and rB, respectively.
Under the proposed matrix partition, the matrix product is given by
A1B1 A1B2 . . . A1BrB
A2B1 A2B2 . . . A2BrB
...
...
. . .
...
ArAB1 ArAB2 . . . ArABrB

.
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The user encodes the matrices A and B according to
A˜i =
rA∑
j=1
A j x
( j−1)
i
+
ℓ∑
k=1
KAk x
(k+rA−1)
i
,
B˜i =
rB∑
j=1
B j x
( j−1)(rA+ℓ)
i
+
ℓ∑
k=1
KBk x
(k+rA−1)+(rB−1)(rA+ℓ)
i
,
where all entries of matrices KA1, . . . ,KAℓ ∈ F(m/rA)×n and KB1, . . . ,KBℓ ∈ Fn×(p/rB) are
i.i.d. uniform random variables. The exponents of the xi are carefully chosen to facilitate
the alignment of undesired components [11]. Details are discussed in the next paragraph.
The user sends the pair
(
A˜i, B˜i
)
to the server where server i in return computes Zi = A˜iB˜i
and sends its answer Zi back to the user. The user seeks to retrieve AB by observing up
to N polynomials p(xi), i = 1, . . . , N of degree QN,ℓ − 1, where QN,ℓ , (rA + ℓ)(rB + 1) − 13.
The polynomial corresponds to p(x) = ∑4i=1 pi(x) and is given by
p (x) =
rA∑
j=1
rB∑
j ′=1
A jB j ′x
j+( j ′−1)(rA+ℓ)−1
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
,p1(x)
+
ℓ∑
k=1
rB∑
j ′=1
KAkB j ′x
k+rA+( j ′−1)(rA+ℓ)−1
︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
,p2(x)
+
rA∑
j=1
ℓ∑
k ′=1
A jKBk ′ x
j+k ′+(rA−1)+(rB−1)(rA+ℓ)−1
︸                                                  ︷︷                                                  ︸
,p3(x)
+
ℓ∑
k=1
ℓ∑
k ′=1
KAkKBk ′ x
k+k
′
+2(rA−1)+(rB−1)(rA+ℓ)
︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸
,p4(x)
.
(4)
To reconstruct AB, the user is interested in p1(x). The remaining terms pi(x), i = 2, . . . , 4,
can be thought of interference. Thus, with respect to p1(x) each exponent in x needs to
have only one attributable item A jB j ′ to distinguish desired components from each other
and also from undesired components KAkB j ′, A jKBk ′ and KAkKBk ′ . One can verify that
each exponent of p1(x) does not occur in the remaining undesired terms pi(x), i = 2, . . . , 4. In
contrast, there are multiple items assigned to the remaining exponents not being included
in p1(x). In other words, we align multiple undesired items to single exponents. Thus, this
scheme is called an aligned secret sharing scheme. A pictorial representation of the association
of components to exponents is provided in Fig. 2. The exponents of xi in A˜i and B˜i are
3We frequently omit using the first or the second subscript when N or ℓ remain constant, e.g., we simply write Q
to denote QN,ℓ for constant (N, ℓ). In almost all cases where N is of no concern, we omit the first index and write Qℓ .
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Fig. 2: Number line of the exponent of the polynomial p(x) and its association to the terms pi(x), i = 1, . . . , 4.
chosen in the encoding process to avoid overlaps of desired terms (i) with each other and
(ii) with undesired terms while simultaneously create as many alignment opportunities as
possible when computing Zi = A˜iB˜i. The desired terms consume rArB exponents while
the interference occupies ℓ(rB + 1) + rA − 1 exponents. More specifically, the first ℓ(rB − 1)
components of p2(x) are not aligned with other interference components of p3(x) and p4(x).
In contrast, the remaining rA + 2ℓ − 1 exponents of p2(x), p3(x) or p4(x) are subject to
(subspace) alignment of at least two components.
Recall that the polynomial p(x) has a degree of Q − 1 and the user has access to N obser-
vations. In order to enable decoding, we have to ensure that the degree of the polynomial
does not exceed the total number of available servers, or observations, N, i.e.,
QN,ℓ(rA, rB) , (rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1 ≤ N . (5)
Thus, the user can retrieve its desired items by using polynomial interpolation. Since the
user recovers rArB desired items out of QN,ℓ(rA, rB) calculated items, the aligned secret
sharing scheme achieves a rate of
RN,ℓ(rA, rB) , rArB
QN,ℓ(rA, rB)
=
rArB
(rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1
.
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In order to maximize the rate RN,ℓ(rA, rB)4, we need to solve the optimization problem
max
rA,rB
rArB
(rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1
(6)
subject to (rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1 ≤ N (6a)
rA, rB ∈ Z+. (6b)
We denote the optimal decision variables and objective value of (6) by (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) and R⋆.
Further, we note that the effective number of server observations the user needs to
determine the matrix product AB is Q. Thus, the aligned secret sharing strategy is Q-
securely recoverable. In order to make the aligned secret sharing scheme less prone to slower
computing servers, or stragglers, one has to solve the optimization problem
min
rA,rB
(rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1 (7)
subject to
rArB
(rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1
≥ Rth (7a)
(rA + ℓ) (rB + 1) − 1 ≤ N (7b)
rA, rB ∈ Z+. (7c)
The optimization problems (6) and (7) find the best choice of how to partition the left
and right matrices at the user for given N and ℓ (and a minimum rate requirement Rth ≤ R⋆
in (7)). For both problems, we propose close-to-optimal analytical solutions. The solutions
to the rate maximization problem (6) and Q-secure recoverability problem are stated in
Theorem 1 and 2, respectively. To differentiate the (optimal) solution of (7) from (6), we
use the breve mark (˘) instead of the star symbol (⋆), e.g., Q˘ instead of Q⋆.
IV. Solution of the Matrix Partitioning Problem (6) and Discussion
Theorem 1. The solution (rˆA, rˆB) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization
problem (6) for given parameters N and ℓ. Hereby,
rˆB = max
{
1,
⌈
−3
2
+
√
1
4
+
N
ℓ
⌉ }
(8)
and rˆA is the largest possible integer rA ≥ 1 that satisfies the inequality
(rA + ℓ)(rˆB + 1) − 1 ≤ N . (9)
4For the sake of simplicity, the notation of RN,ℓ (rA, rB) is aligned with that of QN,ℓ (rA, rB).
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Proof. The proof is based on the inductive approach of deriving the relationship between
consecutive optimal solution pairs (r⋆
ℓ−1,A, r
⋆
ℓ−1,B) and (r⋆ℓ,A, r⋆ℓ,B). Ultimately, under some
additional approximations, this helps us in deriving (8) and (9). For further details, we
refer the reader to Section A. 
Remark 1 (Upper bound). The best information-theoretic upper bound known of the two-
sided matrix multiplication problem on the rate is derived in [10]. The upper bound of
the two-sided model is in fact the one-sided model for which the capacity is known to be
Cone-sided =
N−ℓ
N
.
Remark 2. Compared to the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon (CT) [10, Theorem
2], our aligned secret sharing scheme significantly improves on the communication rate (see
Fig. 3). This is illustrated in Fig. 3 when comparing the achievable communication rate of
’Unequal’ and ’Equal’ with ’CT’. Specifically, while our scheme ensures a non-zero rate for
at most ⌊(N−1)/2⌋ colluding servers, CTs scheme support only ⌊
√
N − 1⌋ colluding servers.
Further, appropriate matrix partition is of importance when comparing the achievable rates
of optimized (or unequal) and equal (rA = rB) partitions in Fig. 3. The unequal partitions
use the partitioning proposed in Theorem 1.
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Fig. 3: Comparison between the achievable communication rates for (i) one-sided secure matrix multiplication
(which is an upper bound on two-sided multiplication), (ii) unequally and (iii) equally partitioned aligned secret
sharing scheme and (iv) the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon for N = 1000 as a function of the number of
colluding servers ℓ.
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Fig. 4: Plot of the maximum additive gap maxℓ∈[N] |R⋆ℓ − Rˆℓ | as a function of N.
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Fig. 5: Plot of the number of sub-optimal solutions of the provided estimation to the optimization problem (6) as
a function of N. Note that the number of sub-optimal solutions for fixed N and variable ℓ is upper bounded by N.
Remark 3 (Additive gap). To evaluate the quality of our proposed analytical solution, we
evaluate the maximum additive gap maxℓ∈[N] |R⋆ℓ − Rˆℓ | (see Fig. 4). Hereby, R⋆ℓ denotes the
optimal rate of the optimization problem (6) and Rˆℓ our proposed estimate. The optimal
solution is determined in a brute-force fashion by exhaustive search which is costly in
computation. Numerical results show that the proposed solution is at most 3 ·10−2 additively
off from the optimal solution.
Remark 4. Our proposed solution is frequently the optimal solution. Fig. 5 shows the
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number of sub-optimal solutions of the provided estimation to the optimization problem (6)
for a given N and variable ℓ. In theory, for a given N, the number of sub-optimal solutions
is upper bounded by N. Interestingly, this figure shows that ’# sub-optimal solutions ≪ N’.
This suggests that our solution solves (6) for almost all ℓ ∈ [N] optimally except of very
few cases where an almost negligible additive gap is attained.
Remark 5 (Server computational complexity). We define the per-server computational
complexity as the number of necessary multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations to determine
Zi = A˜iB˜i. Clearly, the MAC complexity under a general rA and rB-partition of matrices A
and B becomes Θ
(
mnp
rArB
)
. Recall that the denominator rArB < N represents the dimension
reserved for desired sub-block matrix products. For constant N and ℓ, our secret sharing
scheme achieves (in comparison to CTs scheme) the better alignment efficiency and thus a
larger product rArB. This in return, results in an improved per-server complexity when m, n
and p remain constant.
Remark 6 (User decoding complexity). The decoding at the user can be interpreted as
an interpolation of a Q − 1-degree polynomial for mp
rArB
times. Hereby, the complexity of a
t-degree polynomial interpolation is O(t log2 t log log t) [12]. Thus, the decoding complexity
at the user is of order O(mp log2 η log log η) with η = max{rA, ℓ} rB.
Remark 7 (Recovery threshold). The effective number of server observations the user needs
to determine the matrix product AB is (after rate maximization) Q⋆. In the problem (6),
it is desirable to choose rA and rB as large as possible without violating the inequality
constraint Q ≤ N. Typically, after rate maximization we obtain highly straggler-dependent
solutions for which Q⋆ ≈ N.
Remark 8 (Input matrix dimension). Recall that the user splits the input matrices A and
B into rA sub-matrices Ai ∈ F(m/rA)×n and rB sub-matrices B j ∈ Fn×(p/rB). According to
Theorem 1, we can easily show from (8)
max
{
1,−3
2
+
√
N
ℓ
}
≤ rB ≤
√
N
ℓ
and based on that from (9)
max
{
1,
√
Nℓ − ℓ − 1
}
≤ rA ≤ 2
√
Nℓ − ℓ + 2.
This suggests that for feasibility in the matrix partitioning, p and m shall (at least) scale
according to Θ(
√
N/ℓ) and Θ(
√
Nℓ), respectively.
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V. Solution of the Matrix Partitioning Problem (7)
Theorem 2. The solution (˚rA, r˚B) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization
problem (7) for a given parameter Rth which is feasible with respect to the given parameters
N und ℓ. Hereby,
r˚B = max
{
1,
⌈
2
1 − Rth
− 2
⌉ }
(10)
and r˚A is the smallest possible integer rA ≥ 1 that satisfies the inequality
rAr˚B
(rA + ℓ) (˚rB + 1) − 1
≥ Rth. (11)
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The current version of this paper
does not include a detailed proof. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the two-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, where a user
is interested in the matrix product AB of two private matrices A and B. The user tries to
conceal the private matrices from N servers (where we allow for up to ℓ servers to collude),
but uses them to compute the matrix product. We propose a partition-based aligned secret
sharing scheme. Next, we formulate and solve two optimization problems that determine the
optimal matrix partition of input matrices A and B to (i) maximize the communication rate
of this scheme and (ii) to maximize the recovery threshold. With respect to objective (i),
numerical results show that this scheme significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art scheme
of Chang and Tandon presented in [10]. In summary, our work shows that appropriate matrix
partition is of importance in enabling rate-efficient, straggler-robust and secure two-sided
distributed matrix computation.
Appendix A
Close-to-optimal Solution of Optimization Problem (6)
Next, we propose a close-to-optimal solution to the optimization problem (6). To establish
this solution, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. For every optimal solution of the optimization problem (6), there is at least one
maximizing pair denoted by (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) which satisfies r⋆
A
≥ r⋆
B
.
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Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that the maximizing pair (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) satisfies r⋆
A
< r⋆
B
.
The associated number of exploited servers is then given by
Q⋆(r⋆A, r⋆B) =
(
r⋆A + ℓ
) (
r⋆B + 1
) − 1.
On the other hand, the associated number of exploited servers for the inverted pair (r⋆
B
, r⋆
A
)
corresponds to
Q′(r⋆B, r⋆A) =
(
r⋆B + ℓ
) (
r⋆A + 1
) − 1.
Subtracting Q′ from Q⋆ gives
Q′ − Q⋆ = (r⋆A − r⋆B)(ℓ − 1) ≤ 0.
When Q′ − Q⋆ ≤ 0, we have
Q′ − Q⋆ ≤ 0 ⇔ Q′ ≤ Q⋆
⇔R(r⋆B, r⋆A) =
r⋆
A
r⋆
B
Q′
≥ r
⋆
A
r⋆
B
Q⋆
= R⋆(r⋆A, r⋆B). (12)
We infer from inequality (12) that the inverted pair (r⋆
B
, r⋆
A
) attains a higher rate than
(r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
). This is in contradiction with the assumption that (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) is a maximizing pair.

Lemma 2. When ℓmax = ⌊ N−12 ⌋ and N ≥ 3, (r⋆A, r⋆B) = (1, 1) is an unique maximizing pair of
the optimization problem (6).
Proof. Define
ℓmax =
⌊
N − 1
2
⌋
=

N
2 − 1 N even
N−1
2 N odd
.
We set (rA, rB) = (1 + a, 1 + b), where a, b ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, such that the number of exploited
servers equals
QN,ℓmax =
(
rA + ℓmax
) (rB + 1) − 1
=
(
a + ℓmax + 1
) (b + 2) − 1
=

N − 1 + 2a + b + ab + ℓmaxb N even
N + 2a + b + ab + ℓmaxb N odd
.
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The only feasible pair (a, b) satisfying the inequality constraint of the optimization problem
(6) is (a, b) = (0, 0). Therefore the only maximizing pair of the optimization problem (6) is
(r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) = (1, 1). 
Definition 1. For a given ℓ and N, (rA, rB) is a strongly feasible pair of the optimization
problem (6) if and only if
(i) it satisfies the inequality constraint QN,ℓ(rA, rB) ≤ N,
(ii) and there exists no feasible pair (r′
A
, rB) or (rA, r′B) with r′A ≥ rA or r′B ≥ rB.
Lemma 3. Every maximizing pair (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) of the optimization problem 6 satisfies the strong
feasibility condition.
Proof. The rate for any pair (rA, rB) ∈ Z+2 is given by
R(rA, rB) =
rArB
rArB + ℓrB + rA + ℓ − 1
=
1
1 + ℓ
rA
+
1
rB
+
ℓ−1
rArB
. (13)
Suppose by contradiction that the maximizing pair (r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) is not strongly feasible, i.e., it
does not satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 3. Thus, rA or rB can be increased to values
above r⋆
A
or r⋆
B
without violating the inequality constraint of the optimization problem.
An increase of rA or rB leads to an increase in the rate (cf. Eq. 13). This contradicts that
(r⋆
A
, r⋆
B
) is a maximizing pair of the optimization problem 6. 
Lemma 4. Let (rA, rB) be a strongly feasible pair. When ℓ decreases by one (ℓ ← ℓ − 1)
and we simultaneously increase rA by one (rA ← rA + 1) while keeping rB constant (i) has
no effect on the number of exploited servers and keeps it at Q˜ , Qℓ(rA, rB), (ii) generates a
new strongly feasible pair (rA + 1, rB) at ℓ − 1 and (iii) increases the rate additively by rBQ˜ .
Proof. Consider the pairs
(
r1,A, r1,B
)
and
(
r2,A, r2,B
)
, where r2,A = r1,A + 1 and r2,B = r1,B.
The number of exploited servers for the pair
(
r2,A, r2,B
)
with ℓ2 = ℓ1 − 1 colluding servers is
given by
Q˜ , Qℓ2(r2,A, r2,B) =
(
r1,A + ℓ1 + 1 − 1
) (
r1,B + 1
) − 1 = Qℓ1(r1,A, r1,B). (14)
From Qℓ2 = Qℓ1, (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4 readily follow. The rate associated with the pair(
r2,A, r2,B
)
then becomes
Rℓ2(r2,A, r2,B) =
r2,Ar2,B
Qℓ2(r2,A, r2,B)
=
(r1,A + 1)r1,B
Qℓ1(r1,A, r1,B)
=
r1,Ar1,B
Q˜
+
r1,B
Q˜
.
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
Lemma 5. Suppose that (r1,A, r1,B) and (r2,A, r2,B) are two strongly feasible pairs, where
r2,B ≥ r1,B and r1,A+1 ≥ r1,B. Decreasing ℓ by one (ℓ ← ℓ−1) and simultaneously increasing
r1,A (r1,A ← r1,A + 1) and r2,A (r2,A ← r2,A + 1) by one while not changing r1,B and r2,B
results in an increase of the rate for both of the pairs (r1,A, r1,B) and (r2,A, r2,B). The additive
increase in the rate for the pair (r2,A, r2,B) is larger than for the pair (r1,A, r1,B).
Proof. We have r1,A + 1 ≥ r1,B so that
r21,B ≤ (r1,A + 1)r1,B ≤ (r1,A + ℓ)r1,B ≤ (r1,A + ℓ)(r1,B + 1) − 1 = Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
⇔ r21,B + r1,BQℓ(r1,A, r1,B) ≤ r1,BQℓ(r1,A, r1,B) + Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
⇔ r1,B
Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
≤ r1,B + 1
r1,B +Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
(15)
follows. Since (r1,A, r1,B) is a strongly feasible pair (cf. Definition 1), neither r1,A nor r1,B
can increase while the other element of the pair (r1,A, r1,B) remains constant. Recall that
Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B) =
(
r1,A + ℓ
) (
r1,B + 1
) −1 ≤ N . (16)
Incrementing r1,A by one increases Qℓ by r1,B + 1. Similarly, increasing r1,B by one enlarges
Qℓ by r1,A + ℓ. Moreover, r1,A ≥ r1,B and ℓ ≥ 1 implies
r1,A + ℓ ≥ r1,B + 1.
Therefore, strong feasibility along with above observation suggests that Qℓ is at least N−r1,B .
We remind the reader that as long as Qℓ < N − r1,B, the strong feasibility assumption is
violated. As a result, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r1,A, r1,B)
is lower bounded according to
N − r1,B ≤ Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B).
On the other hand, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r2,A, r2,B)
is bounded from above by
Qℓ(r2,A, r2,B) ≤ N .
Therefore
Qℓ(r2,A, r2,B) − Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B) ≤ r1,B
⇔ Qℓ(r2,A, r2,B) ≤ Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B) + r1,B . (17)
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Combining inequalities (15), (17) and r1,B ≤ r2,B, we get
r1,B
Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
(15)
≤ r1,B + 1
r1,B +Qℓ(r1,A, r1,B)
(17)
≤ r1,B + 1
Qℓ(r2,A, r2,B)
≤ r2,B
Qℓ(r2,A, r2,B)
.
Hereby,
r1,B
Qℓ(r1,A,r1,B ) and
r2,B
Qℓ(r2,A,r2,B ) are the corresponding terms by which the rate increases
after subjecting the pairs (r1,A, r1,B) and (r2,A, r2,B) to the mapping of Lemma 4. 
Lemma 6. Consider the optimization problem (6) for a constant N and two consecutive
values of ℓ denoted by ℓ1 and ℓ2 = ℓ1 − 1, respectively. The optimal variables for these two
problems, represented by r⋆
ℓ1
, (r⋆
1,A
, r⋆
1,B
) if ℓ = ℓ1 and r⋆ℓ2 , (r
⋆
2,A
, r⋆
2,B
) if ℓ = ℓ2, have a
specific relation. That is, if r⋆
ℓ1
is known, there are just two possibilities for r⋆
ℓ2
:
(i) r⋆
ℓ2
=
(
r⋆
1,A
+ 1, r⋆
1,B
)
,
(ii) r⋆
ℓ2
satisfies r⋆
2,A
≤ r⋆
1,A
and r⋆
2,B
> r⋆
1,B
.
Proof. In the following, we go through three possibilities in the choice of r⋆
2,B
in comparison
to r⋆1,B: (i) r⋆2,B = r⋆1,B, (ii) r⋆2,B < r⋆1,B and (iii) r⋆2,B > r⋆1,B.
(i) If r⋆
2,B
= r⋆
1,B
, choose r⋆
2,A
= r⋆
1,A
+ a, a ∈ Z. Then, the number of exploited servers
becomes:
Q⋆ℓ2(r
⋆
ℓ2
) = (r⋆2,A + ℓ2) (r⋆2,B + 1) − 1
=
(
r⋆1,A + a + ℓ1 − 1
) (
r⋆1,B + 1
) − 1
=
(
r⋆1,A + a
′
+ ℓ1
) (
r⋆1,B + 1
) − 1 ≤ N, (18)
where a′ = a−1, a′ ∈ Z. Since the pair r⋆
ℓ1
is optimal, according to Lemma 3, it must be
strongly feasible. Due to the strong feasibility of the pairs r⋆
ℓ1
and r⋆
ℓ2
, we have a′ = 0.
The other possibilities a′ ∈ Z+ or a′ ∈ Z− are sub-optimal. First, if (18) is satisfied for
a′ ∈ Z+ contradicts with the strong feasibility assumption of the pair r⋆
ℓ1
. Second, if
a′ ∈ Z−, there exists another strongly feasible pair (r⋆2,A − a′, r⋆2,B) for ℓ = ℓ1. Then, this
strongly feasible pair fulfills the inequality
Q⋆ℓ1(r
⋆
ℓ1
) = (r⋆1,A + ℓ1) (r⋆1,B + 1) − 1
=
(
r⋆2,A − a + ℓ2 + 1
) (
r⋆2,B + 1
) − 1
=
(
r⋆2,A − a′ + ℓ2
) (
r⋆2,B + 1
) − 1 ≤ N,
where a′ = a−1 and a′ ∈ Z−. However, this is in conflict with the pair r⋆
ℓ2
being strongly
feasible. In summary, this establishes possibility (i) of Lemma 6.
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(ii) If r⋆2,B < r
⋆
1,B, we choose r
⋆
2,A so that the pair r˜ℓ1 , (r⋆2,A − 1, r⋆2,B) is strongly feasible for
ℓ1. Recall from Lemma 4 that the pair r
⋆
ℓ2
is also strongly feasible if ℓ2 = ℓ1 − 1 and N
being constant. Simultaneously, the pair r⋆
ℓ1
maximizes the rate RN,ℓ1. Thus, we have
RN,ℓ1(r˜⋆ℓ1) ≤ RN,ℓ1(r
⋆
ℓ1
). (19)
We denote the rate increase from the rate pair r˜ℓ1 to r
⋆
ℓ2
when ℓ decreases by one
(ℓ1 ← ℓ2) by ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r˜ℓ1 ← r⋆ℓ2). Similarly, ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r
⋆
ℓ1
← r˜ℓ2) refers to the rate
increase from r⋆
ℓ1
to r˜ℓ2 , (r⋆1,A + 1, r⋆1,B). Thus, the overall achievable rates at pairs r⋆ℓ2
and r˜ℓ2 correspond to
RN,ℓ2(r⋆ℓ2) = RN,ℓ1(r˜ℓ1) + ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r˜ℓ1 ← r
⋆
ℓ2
)
RN,ℓ2(r˜ℓ2) = RN,ℓ1(r⋆ℓ1) + ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r
⋆
ℓ1
← r˜ℓ2)
. (20)
Due to Lemma 5, we have ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r⋆ℓ1 ← r˜ℓ2) ≥ ∆N,ℓ1←ℓ2(r˜ℓ1 ← r
⋆
ℓ2
). Consequently,
we infer from (19) and (20) that RN,ℓ2(r˜ℓ2) ≥ RN,ℓ2(r⋆ℓ2). However, this violates the
assumption of optimality at r⋆
ℓ2
. Thus, r⋆
ℓ2
cannot be a maximizing pair if r⋆
2,B
< r⋆
1,B
.
(iii) If r⋆
2,B
> r⋆
1,B
, the number of exploited servers Q⋆
ℓ2
for the pair r⋆
ℓ2
can be lower bounded
according to
Q⋆ℓ2(r
⋆
ℓ2
) = (r⋆2,A + ℓ2) (r⋆2,B + 1) − 1
=
(
r⋆2,A − 1 + ℓ1
) (
r⋆2,B + 1
) − 1
≥ (r⋆2,A − 1 + ℓ1) (r⋆1,B + 2) − 1.
(21)
Since Q⋆
ℓ2
(r⋆
ℓ2
) ≤ N, we infer that(
r⋆2,A − 1 + ℓ1
) (
r⋆1,B + 2
) − 1 ≤ N . (22)
Since the pair r⋆
ℓ1
is strongly feasible, we deduce from (22) that
r⋆2,A − 1 ≤ r⋆1,A − 1 ⇔ r⋆2,A ≤ r⋆1,A.
Thus, possibility (iii) of Lemma 6 is shown.

Beginning from ℓmax = ⌊ N−12 ⌋, where r⋆ℓmax = (1, 1) (cf. Lemma 2), we seek to determine
the optimal r⋆
ℓ−1 , (r⋆ℓ−1,A, r⋆ℓ−1,B) from r⋆ℓ , (r⋆ℓ,A, r⋆ℓ,B). To this end, we exploit Lemma 6,
which states that if ℓ decreases by 1, either (i) r⋆
ℓ,B
= r⋆
ℓ−1,B or (ii) r⋆ℓ,B > r⋆ℓ−1,B. Specifically,
beginning from ℓmax, we iteratively move backwards towards ℓmin = 1 and estimate the values
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of ℓ at which r⋆
ℓ,B
increases in comparison to previous iterates. This helps us to determine
close-to-optimal estimates rˆℓ,B for a given ℓ at constant N. Using these estimates rˆℓ,B, one
can solve for rˆℓ,A using the inequality of the optimization problem (6).
Let us start with the process of finding ℓ, where r⋆
ℓ,B
must increase compared to r⋆
ℓ−1,B.
In other words, we restrict ourself to track at which values of ℓ ∈ [ℓmin : ℓmax], r⋆ℓ,B changes.
For notational simplicity, we rewrite r⋆
ℓm,B
by m and denote its corresponding pair by r⋆
ℓm,A
.
Here, ℓm denotes the first iterate
5, or largest ℓ, for which the optimal r⋆
B
changes from m′
to m, or mathematically,
ℓm = max{ℓ ∈ [ℓmin : ℓmax] | r⋆ℓ,B = m}.
According to (ii) of Lemma 6, the difference of rB-values at neighboring ℓ-values – ℓm and
ℓm − 1 – i.e.,
r⋆ℓm,B − r
⋆
ℓm−1,B = m − m
′
is lower-bounded by 1. Recall that this difference does not have to be necessarily one.
However, if we relax the integer assumption on ℓm and ℓm−1, we can find an ℓm such that
m = m′ + 1. This is shown in Fig. 6 (by the step functions in the interval ℓm ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓm′).
We will see at the end of this appendix that the values of m which are not associated to
(positive) integer-valued ℓm are excluded from the results by using the integer assumption.
Furthermore, the non integer values of rˆℓ,B are avoided by applying the ceiling function ⌈·⌉.
We define
dm = |ℓm′ − ℓm |
as the required number of steps in ℓ needed to change r⋆
B
from m′ to m. In the sequel, we
neglect that ℓ, rA and dm are integer numbers. In the notation this is accounted by using ℓˆ,
rˆA and dˆm, respectively.
Due to Lemma 4, the rate of the optimal pair (r⋆
ℓm,A
, m) is larger than the rate of the
sub-optimal pair (r⋆
ℓm+1,A
+ 1,m′). This translates to the inequality
m′
(
r⋆
ℓm+1,A
+ 1
)
Q⋆
ℓm+1
≤
mr⋆
ℓm,A
Q⋆
ℓm
. (23)
5Recall that we move backwards from ℓmax to ℓmin.
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ℓm = 4 ℓˆm ℓˆm−1 ℓm′ = 5 ℓˆm′
m′ = m − 5
m − 4
m − 3
m − 2
m − 1
m
ℓ
r⋆
ℓ,B
dm
dˆm dˆm−1 dˆm−2 dˆm−3 dˆm′+1
Fig. 6: Illustrative behavior of rℓ,B with respect to ℓˆm for N = 10000, ℓm = 4, m = r⋆ℓm,B = 49 and
m′ = r⋆
ℓm′,B
= 44. In our approximation we allow for a non-integer relaxation in ℓm which we denote by ℓˆm. This
allows us to associate values ℓˆj to rℓ,B ∈ [m′ : m]. According to the figure, ℓˆm is given by ℓˆm = ℓˆm′ −
m∑
i=m′+1
dˆi
or ℓˆm = ℓmax −
m∑
i=2
dˆi.
Applying (i) of Lemma 6 on the pairs (r⋆
ℓm′,A
,m′) and (r⋆
ℓm+1,A
,m′) leads to
r⋆ℓm+1,A = r
⋆
ℓm′,A
+ dm − 1.
We can now reformulate (23) as
m′(r⋆
ℓm′,A
+ dm)
Q⋆
ℓm+1
≤
mr⋆
ℓm,A
Q⋆
ℓm
. (24)
Assuming that the number of exploited servers is almost constant, i.e., Q⋆
ℓm+1
≈ Q⋆
ℓm
allows us
to ignore the denominators of the fractions in (24). Further, we apply the integer relaxation
such that m′ = m− 1. These approximations allow us to transform (24) to an equality given
by6
(m − 1) (rˆℓm−1,A + dˆm) = mrˆℓm,A
⇔ dˆm = m
m − 1 rˆℓm,A − rˆℓm−1,A, (25)
6Due to these approximations, we replace the ”⋆ ” superscript with ”̂”.
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where m ∈ Z+ \ {1}. Next, we calculate Qˆℓm for the pair (rˆℓm,A, m) as follows
Qˆℓm = (rˆℓm,A + ℓm) (m + 1) − 1
=
(
rˆℓm,A + ℓmax −
m∑
i=2
dˆi
)
(m + 1) − 1
= rˆℓm,A (m + 1) + ℓmax (m + 1) −
( m∑
i=2
dˆi
)
(m + 1) − 1
(a)≈ rˆℓm,A (m + 1) +
N
2
(m − 1 + 2) −
(
m∑
i=2
dˆi
)
(m + 1) − 1
= N + rˆℓm,A (m + 1) +
N
2
(m − 1) −
(
m∑
i=2
dˆi
)
(m + 1) − 1
(b)
= N − 1,
where (a) and (b) are due to the approximations ℓmax ≈ N2 and Qˆℓm ≈ N − 1, respectively. It
is easy to conclude from above equality that
rˆℓm,A (m + 1) +
N
2
(m − 1) −
(
m∑
i=2
dˆi
)
(m + 1) = 0. (26)
From Eq. (26), we get
m∑
i=2
dˆi =
(m − 1)
(m + 1)
N
2
+ rˆℓm,A. (27)
Similarly, we can approximate Qˆℓm−1 by the same approach such that
m−1∑
i=2
dˆi =
(m − 2)
m
N
2
+ rˆℓm−1,A. (28)
Subtracting (28) from (27) gives
dˆm =
(
m − 1
m + 1
− m − 2
m
)
N
2
+ rˆℓm,A − rˆℓm−1,A
=
N
m (m + 1) + rˆℓm,A − rˆℓm−1,A.
(29)
From the Equations 25 and 29 dˆm is given by
dˆm =
1
m + 1
N − rˆℓm−1,A
(c)
=
1
m + 1
N − (m − 2)(m − 1)m N
=
2N
(m − 1)m(m + 1) .
(30)
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Note that in (c), we used rˆℓm,A = (m−1)m(m+1)N. Considering Eq. (30) and the approximation
ℓmax ≈ N2 , ℓˆm corresponds to (cf. Fig. 6)
ℓˆm =
N
2
−
m∑
i=2
dˆi
=
N
2
− N
m∑
i=2
2
(i − 1)i(i + 1)
=
N
2
− N
(
m∑
i=2
1
i − 1−
2
i
+
1
i + 1
)
=
N
2
− N
[(
m∑
i=2
1
i − 1 −
1
i
)
+
(
m∑
i=2
−1
i
+
1
i + 1
)]
=
N
2
− N
[
1 − 1
m
− 1
2
+
1
m + 1
]
=
N
m(m + 1) . (31)
Eq. (31) represents an estimate on the number of colluding servers ℓˆm at which rˆℓ,B increases
to m. We use Eq. (31) to determine m as a function of N and ℓ. Specifically, recall that for
any ℓ ∈ (ℓˆm+1, ℓˆm], we know that rˆℓ,B is constant and we need to ensure that
ℓ ≥ ℓˆm+1,
or according to (31) equivalently
ℓ ≥ N(m + 2)(m + 1)
⇔ m2 + 3m − N
ℓ
+ 2 ≥ 0. (32)
Due to Lemma 1, we choose the smallest m that satisfies (32). This gives us
rˆℓ,B =
⌈
−3
2
+
√
1
4
+
N
ℓ
⌉
(33)
for ℓ ∈ (ℓˆm+1, ℓˆm] with ℓ ∈ Z+. By using the ceiling function, the values of rˆℓ,B which do
not correspond to integer numbers are removed for integers ℓ. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
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